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WASHINGTON'S USEFUL SAFE LIFE: SNIPPING
OFF THE LONG TAIL OF PRODUCT
LIABILITY?
In 1981, the Washington Legislature passed the Tort and Product Lia-
bility Reform Act,' the most extensive legislative intervention in Wash-
ington's tort law this century. 2 The purpose of this comprehensive reform
was to create a more equitable distribution of liability among parties at
fault. 3 Under the existing law the legislature perceived a "product liabil-
ity crisis ' 4 involving uncertain liability to manufacturers and sharply ris-
ing product liability insurance premiums; these in turn led to higher prices
for consumer and industrial goods and discouraged the development of
new products. 5
One important change the legislature made in product liability law was
to include in section 7 of the Act a useful safe life defense. 6 This defense
allows a manufacturer to avoid liability by showing that the normal useful
safe life of the product has passed. Section 7 creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a product's useful safe life has expired after twelve years. 7
In the same section of the Act the legislature made changes in the discov-
ery-of-injury rule that applies to the three-year statute of limitations for
product liability actions. 8 Under the new rule the statute of limitations
I. Ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE chs. 4.22, 7.72 (1981)).
2. Efforts to pass such reform extended over more than five years and were marked by bitter
controversy. Talmadge, Washington's Product Liability Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1, 1 (1981).
3. The preamble to the Act states: "The purpose of this amendatory act is to enact further re-
forms in the tort law to create a fairer and more equitable distribution of liability among parties at
fault." Ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112, 112.
4. WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELEcr COMM. ON TORT & PRODUCr LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL
REPORT, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. 13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 1981
WASH. S. JOUR. 623.
5. Preamble to Tort and Product Liability Reform Act, ch. 27,1981 Wash. Laws 112, 112.
6. Other changes include reverting to a negligence standard for product design and warning
cases, limiting strict liability of retailers, curtailing the use of violations of legislative or administra-
tive regulations as negligence per se, extending comparative fault to prodtuct liability claims, and
adopting a right to contribution between joint tort-feasors. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.22.005-.060,
7.72.010-.050 (1981). See generally Talmadge, supra note 2 (discussing Act's major changes).
7. Section 7 provides:
"Useful safe life" begins at the time of delivery of the product and extends for the time
during which the product would normally be likely to perform or be stored in a safe manner....
(2) Presumption regarding useful safe life. If the harm was caused more than twelve years
after the time of delivery, a presumption arises that the harm was caused after the useful safe life
had expired. This presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.
WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.060 (1981).
8. Subject to the applicable provisions of chapter 4.16 R.C.W. pertaining to the tolling and
extension of any statute of limitation, no claim under this chapter may be brought more than
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begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the
harm and its cause. The legislature's goal in passing section 7 was to
return certainty to the tort litigation system.
This Comment reviews the general law applicable to product liability
claims. Next it analyzes the changes made by section 7. The Comment
argues that it is doubtful whether section 7 will be able to achieve the
legislature's desired goal of added certainty in product liability actions.
The limited number of older claims, the limited spread of the law, and the
use of a preponderance of the evidence test to overcome the twelve-year
presumption stand as obstacles to achieving this end. Furthermore, this
Comment argues that even if section 7 is successful in achieving its goal,
the goal itself may be undesirable. The new provision is unfair to product
liability claimants and counterproductive to the social goal of encourag-
ing safe products.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS
Though the earliest use of the statute of limitations concept dates back
to Roman times, 9 the modern law of limiting the time in which personal
actions may be brought dates from the English Limitations Act of 1623, 10
which established different periods for various types of actions. II Today,
most statutes of limitations focus on the plaintiff's conduct with the inten-
tion of protecting defendants and courts from stale and tenuous claims. 12
Proponents of statutes of limitations claim that if a plaintiff is allowed an
unlimited amount of time to bring a cause of action the evidence neces-
sary to determine liability will fade from memory. 13 Another important
concern is that defendants will face protracted fears of litigation if a plain-
tiff is allowed unlimited time. 14
Contract actions differ from tort actions as to when the statute of limita-
tions is tolled. In a contract suit, the cause of action accrues and the stat-
ute begins to run when the agreement is breached. 15 Under a contract the-
three years from the time the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered the harm and its cause.
Id. § 7.72.060(3).
9. See R. SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE
LAw 318-22 (J. Ledlie trans. 3rd ed. 1907).
10. 21 Jac. I. ch. 16, reprinted in J. ANGELL, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW 505 app. (1876).
11. Id. § 3, reprinted in J. ANGELL, supra note 10, at 506-07 app.
12. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177. I185 (1950).
13. E.g., Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn. 2d 660, 665, 453 P.2d 631,634 (1969).
14. See id. at 664-65,453 P.2d at 634.
15. Taylor v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co.. 64 Wn. 2d 534, 537-38, 392 P.2d 802. 804
(1964): U.C.C. § 2-725(I) (1977).
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ory, then, the date of sale triggers the statute on a product liability claim
because the warranties of quality, kind, or condition are broken by the
seller when they are made at the time of sale. 16 In a tort suit, the cause of
action accrues when the person or product actually produces injury. 17
The development of the strict product liability doctrine, a hybrid of tort
and contract actions, led to confusion over the correct statute of limita-
tions to apply to product liability claims. Confusion arose because relief
for injury to persons and property is available under three theories: (1)
negligence; (2) breach of express or implied warranty; and (3) strict liabil-
ity.18 Although most jurisdictions agree that negligence actions are gov-
erned by tort date-of-injury limitations, 19 the appropriate statute for the
remaining theories is not well-defined.
The reason for the difficulty in deciding which statute of limitations
theory to apply is that the decision necessarily involves a policy choice
between favoring manufacturers or consumers. A date-of-sale statute fa-
vors manufacturers by providing a definite cutoff to product liability after
a set period of time. Such a statute harms consumers, however, by arbi-
trarily cutting off all possible claims without considering how products
are being used. Conversely, a tort date-of-injury statute favors consumers
by providing a right to sue measured from the date of the injury while
subjecting manufacturers to an indefinite term of liability.
Initially, some courts opted for a policy favoring manufacturers and
applied the contract date-of-sale limitations to breach of warranty and
strict liability claims.20 The New York Court of Appeals stated the ration-
ale behind this choice:
We are willing to sacrifice the small percentage of meritorious claims that
might arise after the statutory period has run in order to prevent the many
unfounded suits that would be brought and sustained against manufacturers
ad infinitum. Surely an injury resulting from a defective product many years
after it has been manufactured, presumptively at least, is due to operation
and maintenance. . . . [W]e must make that presumption conclusive. 2'
16. Nelson v. Sponberg, 51 Wn. 2d 371, 374, 318 P.2d 951, 953 (1957); Ingalls v. Angell, 76
Wash. 692,696, 137 P. 309, 310 (1913).
17. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn. 2d 660, 666, 453 P.2d 631, 635 (1969); Hunter v. Knight, Vale &
Gregory, 18 Wn. App. 640, 643,571 P.2d 212, 215 (1977).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT
11-3 to 11-4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COMMERCE REPORT].
19. Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitations-A New Immunity for Product Suppliers,
1977 INS. L.J. 535,539 (1977).
20. E.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490
(1969), overruled in Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975); see also Massery, supra note 19, at 539 (discussing historical approach).
21. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210, 305
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Thus, in warranty or strict liability suits plaintiffs could only bring claims
during the years covered by the state's contract statute of limitations,
which started the date the injuring product was sold. 22
As the strict product liability doctrine evolved and concern for con-
sumer product safety increased, courts vigorously questioned the balance
of policies involved in the choice of contract date-of-sale limitations:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be
divorced before you ever marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn
down a house never built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad.
For substantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as
a sort of legal "axiom," that a statute of limitations does not begin to run
against a cause of action before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a
judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff.23
Courts thus gradually shifted to the tort date-of-injury limitations. Today
the majority of jurisdictions24 hold that the statute of limitations for
breach of warranty and strict-liability suits runs from the date of the plain-
tiff's injury. 25
Washington courts, before the new Act, followed the majority rule and
applied the tort or personal injury statute of limitations to strict liability
and breach of warranty product claims. 26 In addition to using a date-of-
injury statute of limitations, Washington courts applied a judicially-cre-
ated "discovery" rule to product liability claims. 27 Where a product
causes injury or disease which does not manifest itself immediately after
exposure to the product, the claim does not accrue and the statute of limi-
tations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered all of the essential elements of the plaintiff's possible cause of
N.Y.S.2d 490. 495 (1969). The rationale bears a haunting similarity to the rationale used to support
current statutes of repose. See note 45 and accompanying text infra.
22. This period was usually from four to six years. See Massery. supra note 19, at 539.
23. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J.. dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
24. See Massery, supra note 19, at 539; Note, When the Product Ticks: Products Liability and
Statutes of Limitations, II IND. L. REV. 693, 706 (1978). In 1975. New York also shifted position
when the New York Court of Appeals overruled its earlier position and adopted the majority view.
Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975).
25. Product manufacturers often point to the unique disadvantages they face in defending liabil-
ity claims involving older products due to the absence of evidence. The passage of time also affects
the plaintiff because it is more difficult to prove that the defect existed at the time the product left the
manufacturer's plant. Such proof is a prerequisite to recovery in strict liability. Thus, product manu-
facturers are not inequitably burdened by a unique evidentiary disadvantage. See Victorson v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395. 404, 335 N.E.2d 275, 279. 373 N.Y.S.2d 39. 44 (1975).
26. See. e.g., Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 92 Wn. 2d 507. 598 P.2d 1358 (1979). Washington
has a three-year tort or personal injury statute of limitations, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.080(2)
(1981). and a six-year statute of limitations for contract claims, id. § 4.16.040(2).
27. See. e.g., Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp.. 92 Wn. 2d 507, 513. 598 P.2d 1358, 1360 (1979).
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action. 28 Under a strict liability theory these elements include (1) a de-
fect, (2) in existence at the time the product left the manufacturer, (3)
unknown to the user, (4) which made the product unreasonably danger-
ous, and (5) which caused the plaintiffs injury. 29
II. COMMON LAW CONSIDERATION OF TIME LAPSE
Under the common law, if a product liability claim was not barred by
the statute of limitations, liability could nonetheless be avoided under ei-
ther a negligence or strict liability theory by showing that the product
failure was solely a result of natural deterioration.3 0 Nevertheless, mere
evidence of prolonged safe use does not foreclose liability as a matter of
law in the majority of courts:31 "[P]rolonged use of a manufactured arti-
cle is but one factor, albeit an important one, in the determination of the
factual issue whether the [defect or] manufacture proximately caused the
harm.' ' 3 2
The result has been to consider product age on a case-by-case basis.
For example, in Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp.,33 the manufacturer of an
oil derrick was held liable when the derrick collapsed because of a defec-
tive weld even though the derrick had been used safely for fifteen years. 34
In contrast, in Bolander v. Northern Pacific Railway35 the Washington
Supreme Court refused to impose liability for injuries sustained in a
derailment under a negligence theory against a manufacturer of train
wheel bearings because some of those bearings had been manufactured
thirteen years before the accident and had travelled over 136,000 miles in
just the two years preceding the accident. 36
Thus, in Washington, as in most other jurisdictions, the age of a prod-
uct was relevant but not conclusive on issues of negligence and defective-
28. Id. Under a negligence theory this includes proof of duty, breach, causation and damages.
Id. at 511.
29. Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & T.V. Co., 9 Wn. App. 797, 801, 515 P.2d 540, 543
(1973).
30. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 11.03, at 238-39 (1981); 2 id. §
16A(4)(e)(vi), at 3B- 117.
31. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, § 11.03, at239-41.
32. Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
902 (1959); see also Tucker v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 256 Or. 318, 473 P.2d 862, 862-63
(1970) (following same rule); Mickle v. Blackmun, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173, 189-90 (1969)
(same); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 533 n.6, 452 P.2d 729, 735 n.6 (1969) (same); I
L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, § 11.03 at 239-41 (same); Note, Time Lapse in Products
Liability, 4 WILLAMmErE L.J. 394, 395 (1967) (same).
33. 262 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1958).
34. Id. at 675.
35. 63 Wn. 2d 659,388 P.2d 729(1964).
36. Id. at 663,388 P.2d at 731.
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ness. 37 This common law doctrine reflects a view that the passage of time
does not affect all products equally. The conditions of use and amount of
use vary so greatly that blanket time limitations on liability cannot be
fixed. 38
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. State Statutes
Product sellers maintain that they are unable to assess accurately the
probabilities of future liability because no time limitation is placed on
liability under the case-by-case approach. They claim this uncertainty is
one of the major causes of increases in product liability insurance premi-
ums and cutoffs in insurance coverage. 39 Several states have adopted
product liability legislation aimed at meeting the seller's complaints.
Most of the resulting legislation has altered both the statutes of limitations
for product liability and the common law consideration of product age,
but the changes have not been uniform among the states. 40 The new stat-
utes of limitations fall into three basic categories: 4 1 (1) statutes that run
from the date of manufacture of sale;42 (2) statutes that run from the date
of injury, death, or property damage; 43 and (3) statutes that contain two
periods of limitations, one running from the date of death, injury, or
property damage, and a second running from the date of manufacture or
sale.44
37. See Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 533, 452 P.2d 729. 735 (1969) (holding that
it cannot be said as a matter of law that mileage and years of use are factors affecting the likelihood of
a defect). But see Bock v. Truck & Trailer, Inc., 18 Wn. 2d 458, 476, 139 P.2d 706. 714 (1943)
(stating that it is possible for the period of possession to be so protracted and its use so extensive that a
court could say as a matter of law that proximate causation had not been established).
38. See COMMERCE REPORT. supra note 18, at VII-28.
39. Id. at VII-20.
40. See Twerski. Rebuilding the Citadel: The Legislative Assault on the Common Law. TRIAL 55
(1979); see also 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 30. § 16C(2) (discussing different varia-
tions enacted).
41. 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 30. § 16C. In addition to the impact of three
different forms of statutes, the unique terms and exceptions of each state's statute further exacerbate
the lack of uniformity.
42. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. 88 I05-106(b)(2) (Supp. 1979) (10 years); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
411.310 (Baldwin 1979) (5-8 year rebuttable presumption): N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (Supp.
1979) (6 years); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-.01.1-02 (1974) (10-11 years); R. I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13
(Supp. 1979) (10 years); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1979) (6 years): UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-15-3 (Supp. 1979) (6-10 years).
43. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05 (West Supp. 1980) (4 years).
44. E.g.. ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1979) (1 year and 10 years): ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
12-542 to -551 (1978) (2 years and 12 years); COLO. REV. STAT. 88 13-2-403(3) and 13-80-
127.5(1) (Supp. 1978) (3 years and 10 year rebuttable presumption); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-5779 (West Supp. 1980) (3 years and 10 years); IDAHO CODE § 6-1303 (1979) (2 years and 10
Vol. 57:503, 1982
Useful Safe Life Defense
The first variation incorporates a statute of repose. A statute of repose
sets an outside limitation period beyond which no product liability claim
may be brought, usually measured from the date of manufacture or sale. 45
Under this variation, all claims are extinguished after x years from manu-
facture or sale, whether the claims are then in existence or not. As a re-
sult, the cause of action may be barred before it has ever accrued.
Under the second variation, the general tort date-of-injury limit applies
but is shortened. No "outside" statute of repose is coupled with this vari-
ation so there is no possibility of cutoff prior to the existence of the cause
of action.
Under the third variation, a product liability claim is barred if it is (1)
not brought within the standard tort statute of limitations, or (2) brought
more than y years from date of manufacture or sale, even if brought
within the tort statute of limitations. This establishes both an "inside"
limitation period (the regular statute of limitations) and an "outside" pe-
riod (statute of repose) beyond which no claim can be brought.46 Most
states adopting product liability legislation have chosen this third alterna-
tive. 47
B. Washington Product Liability Act
The clamor about the impending product liability crisis led the Wash-
ington Legislature to join the trend towards ameliorative legislation by
enacting the Tort and Product Liability Reform Act.48 The Washington
Legislature included a provision, section 7, to control the "open-ended"
liability problem. Section 7 basically followed 49 the format set forth in
the Model Uniform Product Liability Act promulgated by the United
year rebuttable presumption); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 21.2(b), (d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (2
years and 10-12 years); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Bums Supp. 1979) (2 years and 10 years);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 27A.5805(9) (Supp. 1980) (3 years and 10 years); NEB. REV. STAT. §
25-224(1979) (4 years and 10 years); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979) (3 years and
12 years); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1979) (2 years and 8 years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103
(Supp. 1979) (1 year and 6-10 years).
45. In this respect it is similar to a contract statute of limitations. There is a difference, however,
between statutes of repose and statutes of limitations. The former applies both to accrued and unac-
crued claims, whereas the latter runs from the time a claim accrues and does not have any effect on
unaccrued claims. For example, when an automobile becomes 12 years old the statute of repose
presumptively cuts off any future product liability claims involving the car. The statute of limitations,
on the other hand, would cut off any claim that was not brought within three years of the injury even
if the injury caused by the car came in the first year after purchase.
46. See note 45 supra (discussing difference between statute of repose and statute of limitations).
47. 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 30, § 16C(2)(i), at 3D-4.
48. Ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE chs. 4.22 (contribution among
tort-feasors), 7.72 (products liability) (1981).
49. See SENaTE REPORT, supra note 4, at 41, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. at 632.
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States Department of Commerce. 50 Section 7 contains three basic parts:
(1) a "useful safe life" defense; (2) a twelve-year rebuttable presumption
statute of repose; and (3) a three-year statute of limitations with an ex-
press discovery rule. 51
The useful safe life defense is similar to other affirmative defenses such
as contributory negligence. A manufacturer can avoid liability by show-
ing that the useful safe life of the product had passed before the injury
occurred. The implication of the defense is that injuries at that point are
caused by natural deterioration of the product, not attributable to the man-
ufacturer, instead of a defect in the product. The defense is waived, how-
ever, if not raised by the defendant. Under section 7, the useful safe life
begins at the time of delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee
who is not engaged in the business of either selling the product or using it
as a component part of another product to be sold. 52 The useful safe life
extends for the time during which the product would normally be likely to
perform or would normally be stored in a safe manner. This time is to be
decided on a case-by-case basis. Though the statute does not list the fac-
tors that are to be considered in arriving at a useful safe life, the factors
included in the Model Act should provide a guide. 53 Thus the statute re-
jects alternatives that would allow the manufacturer or some independent
body to fix useful safe lives for all products. 54
There are three general situations where the new defense does not ap-
ply: (1) when the product seller furnished warranties of safety beyond the
useful safe life; (2) when intentional misrepresentations or concealment
of facts about a product proximately cause the claimant's harm; or (3)
50. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT (U.S. Dep't. of Commerce 1979) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL ACT], reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). The Model Act was promulgated in
response to the Final Report of the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability. The Task
Force undertook an extensive examination of the tort litigation system, the insurance industry, and
product manufacturers in an attempt to discover if a product liability crisis existed and, if so. the
cause. The Task Force substantiated some insurance problems cited by manufacturers but found
something less than a crisis. See COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 18, at VI-52 to -56. It identified
three major causes of these problems: (1) insurance rate-making procedures; (2) uncertainties in tort
law; and (3) unsafe manufacturing processes. Id. at 1-21 to -31. The Model Act, although not
greeted by thunderous acclaim, has served as the basis for legislation adopted in Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-572m, -572n, -577a (West Supp. 1981); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 6-1401-09
(1980); and has been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. H.R. 7921, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.060 (1981), reprinted in part in notes 7-8 supra.
52. Id. § 7.72.060(l)(a).
53. See MODEL ACT, supra note 50, §§ I 10(A)(l)(a)-(e) (naming as factors: (1) wear and tear;
(2) deterioration; (3) normal use and repair; (4) representations by the product seller about use, care
and expected life; and (5) modifications and alterations of the product).
54. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 19, 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. at 625-26.
510
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when harm, not manifested until after the useful safe life had expired,
occurred from exposure within the useful safe life. 55
During the twelve-year period following delivery of a product, the
product seller bears the burden of proving that the useful safe life has
expired. 56 After the twelve-year period passes, section 7 erects a rebutt-
able presumption that any harm that occurs is after the product's useful
safe life has expired. 57 This presumption "wall" erected in front of a
product liability claim may only be scaled by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 58
55. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.060(l)(b)(i)-(iii) (1981). The Model Act provides an additional
exception for contribution and indemnity actions. MODEL AcT, supra note 50, § 1 10(B)(2)(c). The
reason the Washington Legislature omitted this exception is unclear. Even with the omission, though,
contribution and indemnity claims will probably not be governed by § 7. Arguably, if a claimant is
forced to overcome the presumption that useful safe life has expired, so should a defendant claiming
contribution. Section 7, however, specifies that its limits apply only to claims arising under §§ 2-7,
thus sparing the contribution claims that are authorized in §§ 12-14 of the Act. WASH. REv. CODE §
7.22.060(l)(a) (1981). Additionally, § 13 provides one year beyond the initial judgment to bring
contribution actions. Id. § 4.22.050(3).
56. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.060(1) (a).
57. Id. Use of a rebuttable presumption probably disposes of any possible constitutional prob-
lems. See generally Note, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation: An Effective Means of Implementing
Change in Products Liability Law?, 30 CASE W. RES. 123, 149-50 (1979) (discussing constitutional
issues). The absolute cutoffs adopted in other states, see notes 42-44 supra, face possible challenges
on equal protection or special class legislation grounds. The basis of these challenges would be that
the statutes of repose grant special immunities from tort liability to product manufacturers that are not
granted to other parties and that impose special burdens on plaintiffs injured by older products.
Even if the Washington Legislature had included a conclusive cutoff after twelve years, decisions
of the Washington courts upholding the similar six-year architect's and builder's statute of repose,
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.16.300-.310 (1981), indicate the cutoff would have been constitutional. See
Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wn. 2d 528, 532, 503
P.2d 108, 111 (1972); Rodriguez v. Niemeyer, 23 Wn. App. 398, 401, 595 P.2d 952, 954 (1979).
The Rodriguez court emphasized the legislative power "to enact a clear line of demarcation to fix a
precise time beyond which no remedy will be available." Id.
Most courts considering constitutional challenges to product liability statutes of repose have upheld
the statutes. Buckner v. GAF Corp., 495 F. Supp. 351, 353 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Johnson v. Star
Mach. Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53, 56 (1974). But see Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392
So. 2d 874, 874 (Fla. 1980) (per curiam) (12 year statute of repose unconstitutional as denying access
to courts guaranteed under Florida Constitution).
Another possible ground for a constitutional attack is that the Act embraces more than one subject
in violation of Washington's constitutional requirement that -[n]o bill shall embrace more than one
subject, and that shall be express in the title." WASH. CONSr. art. II, § 19. Matters embraced in a
statute, however, need only have congruity, be naturally connected with each other, or be cognant
and germane to each other to be considered one subject. State v. Hall, 24 Wash. 255, 64 P. 153, 154
(1901); Tri-M Erectors, Inc. v. Donald M. Drake Co., 25 Wn. App. 264, 268-69, 606 P.2d 709,
711-12 (1980). Because product liability is a subdivision within the general tort field, reforms in
product liability should be germane to general tort reforms. Therefore, the success of this attack is
doubtful.
58. Washington's statute of repose differs in two significant respects from that found in the
Model Act. First, the initial period before the presumption that the useful safe life has passed was
extended from 10 to 12 years. Compare WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.060(2) (1981) (12 years) with
MODEL Acr, supra note 50, § 1 0(B)(1) (10 years). Second, the standard of proof necessary to rebut
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The final provision of section 7 is the continuation of the tort three-year
statute of limitations but with a reformulation of the discovery-of-injury
rule. 59 Even if a claimant has been injured by a product within its useful
life, the claimant must still bring the claim within three years from the
time the claimant discovered, or "in the exercise of due diligence should
have discovered," the harm and its cause. 60 This provision thereby re-
quires that plaintiffs process accrued claims within a reasonable time.
This relatively intricate three-part provision was designed to return cer-
tainty to a tort system perceived as uncertain, and to snip off the potential
"long tail" of liability exposure which supposedly plagues product man-
ufacturers. 6 1 The legislature also wanted to protect the right of a con-
sumer to recover for injuries caused by unsafe products. 62 The ability of
this provision to satisfy these twin goals is questionable. The ultimate
question is whether section 7 of the Washington Act is supportable on
policy grounds. Analysis of this provision indicates that the alleged bene-
fits are primarily illusory and are outweighed by "actual" costs.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE WASHINGTON TORT AND
PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT
A. The Illusory Benefits: Greater Certainty
The major justification for the recent passage of the statute of repose in
section 7 was the perceived existing "long tail" liability exposure, which
allegedly makes it impossible for product liability insurers to fix insur-
ance premiums with any degree of certainty. 63 At first glance such a stat-
ute appears to return certainty by imposing a temporal limit to product
the presumption was reduced from "clear and convincing" to a "preponderance of the evidence."
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.060(2) (1981) (preponderance) with MODEL AcT, supra note 50.
§ I 10(B)(I) (clear and convincing). Both changes were ostensibly made to mitigate the harshness of
the 12 year presumption. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 20, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. at
626.
59. The legislature intended to modify the discovery rule that the Washington Supreme Court
applied to product liability actions in Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 92 Wn. 2d 507, 511,598 P.2d
1358, 1360 (1979). This exacting discovery rule, in which the statute of limitations did not begin to
run until all elements of the cause of action were discovered, was felt to be beyond the understanding
of the layperson. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 20, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. at 626. The
Model Act used the same discovery rule as Washington's but only had a two-year statute of limita-
tions. MODEL AcT, supra note 50, § 110(C). See also Comment, Medical Malpractice Statute of
Limitations in Washington, 57 WASH. L. REV. 317 (1982).
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.060(3) (1981).
61. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 41, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. at 632.
62. Ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112 (preamble to Tort and Product Liability Reform Act).
63. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
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liability. Several factors, however, cast doubt on its ability to truly attain
certainty.
1. Limited Number of Claims Involving Older Products
The first factor is the limited number of product liability claims involv-
ing older products. A major insurance industry survey revealed that
ninety-seven percent of product-related incidents occur within six years
of the date the product was purchased. 64 Even in the capital goods area,
the prime area for long-lived products, 65 eighty-six percent of all bodily
injuries occur within twelve years of the date of manufacture. 66 Thus, in
the product liability field as a whole, the statute of repose would reach
less than three percent of all claims. 67 Equating 'certainty" in three per-
cent of the cases with certainty in the product liability field is question-
able.
Nevertheless, manufacturers and insurers argue that such statutes will
increase certainty and lower insurance rates. First, insurers and manufac-
turers claim that the number of incidents does not reflect the cost of liabil-
ity claims involving older products. 68 Although this is true, total claims
paid on older products still represent a small segment of the product lia-
bility field and provide an insufficient base to return certainty to the over-
all field. 69 Furthermore, administrative and legal fixed expenses of insur-
ers are untouched by the new statute of repose, which further reduces the
64. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, 1976 PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 81-83 (1977) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY].
65. See COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 18, at VII-22. Capital goods consist primarily of ma-
chinery for manufacturing. The Interagency Task Force stated that such machinery typically lasts
from 10-30 years.
66. See CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY, supra note 64, at 82. The Interagency Task Force's legal study
based on 198 appellate cases found that only 13% of the cases involved products over 20 years old.
Only four percent involved products over 25 years old. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 18, at VII-20
to -21. Other surveys have found a higher correlation between older products and product liability
claims. See, e.g., Impact on Product Liability: Hearings Before the Select Senate Comm. on Small
Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 478 (1977) (testimony of James H. Mack, Public Affairs Director,
National Machine Tool Builders Association) (75% of cases involve machines over ten years old and
four out of nine involve machines over 20 years old). Most of these other surveys, however, suffer
from insufficient sample size or other statistical problems.
67. Insurers' administrative expenses further reduce the effect of the statute of repose on insur-
ance premiums. More than half the product liability insurance premiums go to cover insurers' admin-
istrative and legal expenses. J. O'CONNELL. ENDING INSULTTO INJURY 21 (1975). These expenses are
unaffected by any particular product liability doctrine. Thus, the statute of repose can have little if
any impact on this significant portion of a manufacturer's product liability insurance premium.
68. CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY, supra note 64, at 81 (14.2% of payments flow to only 4.8% of
claimants).
69. Id.
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new law's ability to translate greater certainty into reduced insurance pre-
miums. 70
Second, manufacturers and insurers claim that since product liability
insurance premiums are set subjectively, 7' it is the insurer's perception of
uncertainty caused by "long tail" exposure that is important and not hard
facts. 72 Consequently, they argue that the perception of legislative relief
will be translated into lower insurance premiums. 73 This argument is
unrealistic, however, because the insurance business' concern with ulti-
mate profitability requires it to keep close track of specific areas of liabil-
ity. 74 Even if insurance premiums are subjectively determined, the use of
a statute of repose to alter that subjective view is a roundabout means of
attacking the problem. Legislation addressed to ratemaking procedures
would be more direct. 75
2. Limited Spread of Statutes of Repose
A second factor casting doubt on the ability of repose statutes to in-
crease certainty is the limited spread of such statutes. It is true that almost
one half of the states now have some form of repose statute. 76 Unfortu-
nately, the scope of these statutes varies from state to state. 77 Unlike other
forms of insurance, product liability insurance rates are set on a nation-
wide basis. 78 Thus the impact of nonuniform repose enactments among
the states on product liability insurance premiums is questionable. 79
3. Washington's Statute of Repose in Multistate Product Liability
Actions
A third factor casting doubt on the ability of section 7 to increase cer-
tainty is its application in multistate product liability actions. With the
growth of national and international manufacturers and the development
70. See note 67 supra.
71. COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 18, at VII-23.
72. Id. at VII-21; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 19, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. at
625-26.
73. See COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 18, at VII-23.
74. The correlation between the incidence of auto accidents involving young people and differen-
tial insurance rates is a prime example of insurers' monitoring actual claims results.
75. See Twerski, supra note 40, at 56.
76. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
77. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
78. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FOR THE FINAL REPORT OFTHE FEDERAL
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY (1977).
79. See Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations,
56 N.C.L. REV. 663, 672 (1978).
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of national marketing channels, product liability actions increasingly in-
volve more than one state. The choice of a forum in which to bring a
product liability action and the choice of the appropriate law to apply be-
comes more complex in these multistate actions. This raises the issue
whether courts outside Washington will apply the Washington statute of
repose to bar claims that arose in Washington. To the extent they do not
apply the Washington statute of repose, the statute's impact on certainty
is diminished. To illustrate, if P, a citizen of Washington, was injured in
Washington by a thirteen-year-old drill press manufactured in California
by X, a Delaware corporation with principal place of business in Wash-
ington, P's suit in Washington might be barred by the twelve-year statute
of repose. However, P might also be able to bring suit in California, De-
laware, or any other state in which P could obtain jurisdiction over X. In
those suits the question whether section 7 will be applied emerges.
Since statutes of limitations have historically been viewed as procedu-
ral devices, 80 courts generally apply the statute of limitations of the forum
state. 81 In contrast, many courts undertake an interests analysis to deter-
mine which state's substantive law to apply. 82 Thus, a cause of action
may be maintained in a forum where the statute of limitations has not run
with the court applying another state's substantive law, even though the
statute of limitations has run in the state where the cause of action arose. 83
This result, if also applied to statutes of repose, would encourage plain-
tiffs to shop for forums without repose statutes and would reduce the im-
pact of section 7 on the "long tail" liability problem. In the example
above, then, P would sue in California or Delaware, none of which have
statutes of repose.
The historical approach of considering statutes of limitations as
procedural devices has come under attack, 84 and at least one court has
heeded the criticism and considers statutes of limitations to be substan-
80. See, e.g., Cummings v. Cowan, 390 F. Supp. 1251, 1254 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Krussow v.
Stixrud, 33 Wn. 2d 287, 290, 205 P.2d 637, 639 (1949); Chandler v. Humphrey, 177 Wash. 402,
404, 31 P.2d 1012, 1013 (1934); Sobo v. Sobo, 28 Wn. App. 766, 768, 626 P.2d 520, 521 (1981);
R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 127, at 252 (1977); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICTOF LAWS 59 (1980); Massery, supra note 19, at 537.
81. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 111 n.2 (1971); Clarke v. Pennsylvania R.R., 341
F.2d 430,432 (2d Cir. 1965); Page v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 259 F.2d 420,422 (5th Cir. 1958);
Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 428 F. Supp. 646, 650 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Sobo v. Sobo, 28 Wn. App.
766, 768, 626 P.2d 520, 521 (1981).
82. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 1981); Henry v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 1975); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 80, at 62.
83. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 111 n.2; Clarke v. Pennsylvania R.R., 341
F.2d 430,432 (2d Cir. 1965); Cummings v. Cowan, 390 F. Supp. 1251, 1255 (N.D. Miss. 1975); R.
LEFLAR, supra note 80, at 252.
84. R. LEFLAR, supra note 80, at 122; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 80, at 62.
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tive. 85 Even in jurisdictions following the traditional approach, an excep-
tion has developed that, where the statute of limitations extinguishes the
plaintiff's right of action and not just the plaintiff's remedy, it is treated as
substantive rather than procedural law. 86 The prime example of this ex-
ception is wrongful death actions, which are wholly statutory and usually
contain an express time within which the action must be brought. 87 Thus,
if a wrongful death action based on Washington's wrongful death statute
is brought in California, California courts consider themselves bound by
Washington's limitations period. 88
The impact of this exception on section 7 is unclear. Unlike wrongful
death actions, product liability actions existed at common law and are not
creatures of statute. The comprehensive nature of the Washington Act re-
veals, however, the legislative desire to supplant existing common law
product liability doctrine with an inclusive definition of a "product liabil-
ity claim.' '89 The statute of repose arguably extinguishes the "new" right
of action and not just the remedy, which indicates that the limit should be
treated as substantive.
An additional factor supporting application of the exception is the na-
ture of the section 7 limit. The Washington Court of Appeals considered a
similar statute in Sobo v. Sobo. 90 That case considered whether the Wash-
ington court should apply a Missouri statute which established a conclu-
sive presumption that a judgment had been paid ten years after rendered.
The Sobo court found that statute to be within the exception to the tradi-
tional rule and treated it as substantive law. The court, therefore, barred
the judgment creditor's Washington action to collect on the judgment. 9'
The similarly structured twelve-year presumption in section 7 should re-
ceive the same treatment under Washington law.
85. Heavener v. Uniroyal. Inc.. 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412,418 (1973).
86. Clarke v. Pennsylvania R.R., 341 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir. 1965): Bournia v. Atlantic Mari-
time Co., 220 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1955); Michigan v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 17 Ariz. App.
45. 495 P.2d 485. 489 (1972): Sobo v. Sobo. 28 Wn. App. 766. 768. 626 P.2d 520, 521 (1981): R.
LEFI.AR. supra note 80, at 254.
87. See, e.g.. Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981): Ramsay v. Boeing Co..
432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970); Park v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 50 Del. 413. 132 A.2d 54 (1957): R.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 80, at 59-60.
88. Cf. Parhm v. Parhm. 2 Cal. App. 3d 311. 314. 82 Cal. Rptr. 570. 572 (1969) (California
court bound by Washington statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments, which it found to be
substantive).
89. The legislature defined "'product liability claim" to include -'any claim or action previously
based on: Strict liability in tort: negligence; breach of express or implied warranty: . . . or other
claim or action previously based on any other substantive legal theory . WASH. REV. CoDE §
7.72.010(4) (1981).
90. 28 Wn. App. 766,626 P.2d 520 (1981).
91. Id. at 768-70.626 P.2d at 521.
516
Vol. 57:503, 198'?
Useful Safe Life Defense
Even though Washington courts will probably treat the new statute of
repose as substantive law, there is no guarantee that courts in other juris-
dictions will follow suit. The absence of an express indication by the
Washington Legislature that it intended section 7 to be substantive makes
it easier for courts in other jurisdictions to treat section 7 as procedural
law. 92
Even if the statute of repose is treated as substantive law in other states,
there is still no guarantee it will be applied. States use different choice-of-
laws tests, some of which would lead to rejection of the Washington
law. 93 Therefore, because of these numerous uncertainties, it appears
doubtful that Washington's statute of repose will substantially increase
certainty when applied in a multistate context.
4. Choice of Useful Safe Life and Rebuttable Presumption
Two other characteristics of the Washington Act further reduce its abil-
ity to attain certainty. The first is the use of a useful safe life approach.
This amorphous concept, which requires a case-by-case approach for de-
velopment of guidelines, provides little guidance for an insurer to assess
accurately the possibilities for liability of an insured. With so many fac-
tors to consider, it is unclear if the approach is preferable to the prior
common law system. This concern is echoed in ' report put out by the
Interagency Task Force on Product Liability:
92. See COMMERCE REPORT, supra'note 18, at VII-24.
93. One test is the "center of gravity" or "most significant relationship" test which attempts to
quantify contacts betwen events and jurisdictions related to the cause of action. Kuhne, Choice of
Law in Products Liability, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (1972). Because contacts are often split between
many states in product liability actions, choice of law decisions are often arbitrarily made under this
approach.
A second test used is the "governmental interests" approach. Under this approach the qualitative
nature of each state's social, economic, or administrative policy in relationship to the parties, the
transaction, the subject matter, and the litigation fixes the applicable law. Currie, Survival ofActions:
Adjudications versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205, 238-39 (1958). The
competing interests of consumer protection versus limitation of manufacturers' liabilities, however,
provide no assurance that the express desires of the Washington Legislature will be followed outside
Washington.
A third and fourth approach, "principles of preference" and "better law," may be analyzed to-
gether. See generally D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAWS PROCESS 139, 146, 159, 166, 177 (2d ed.
1965) (discussing principles of "preference"); R. LEFLAR, supra note 80, at 245 (discussing "better
law"). In the product liability context, the "principles of preference" approach favors the law of the
jurisdiction that provides greater compensation for a plaintiff or imposes a higher standard of care on
the defendant. D. CAVERS, supra at 139. The "better law" approach allows a court to deliberately
choose the rule it regards as intrinsically better. With the prevailing strict liability policies, both
approaches may reject limitations such as Washington's statute of repose in favor of the more liberal
traditional tort statutes of limitations available in other states. See Note, Date-of-Sale Statutes of
Limitation: An Effective Means of Implementing Change in Products Liability Law?, 30 CASE W.
RES. 123, 145 (1979).
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[W]hile insurers agree that a "useful life" rule could be more flexible and
potentially more equitable than a flat statute of limitations, many feel that
the uncertainty associated with any administrative or judicial procedure for
establishing useful lives would possibly reduce and certainly delay any rate
impact as compared with a statute of limitations modification. 94
A second characteristic of the Act that limits the chance of attaining
certainty has to do with the presumption chosen. First, the length of the
period, twelve years, means that the presumption only applies to a minor-
ity of products. No other state has adopted a statute of repose longer than
Washington's. 95 Second, the standard necessary to rebut the presumption
is potentially lax. The legislature chose a "preponderance of the evi-
dence" test in lieu of the stricter "clear and convincing" standard advo-
cated by the drafters of the Model Act. 96 Such a choice was made to help
mitigate the harshness of the presumption. This may be fair but such
gains in fairness come at the expense of the desired certainty which lay at
the heart of the provision. In attempting to balance conflicting policies,
the legislature may have frustrated both policies. Only application of the
preponderance of the evidence standard in the courts will determine how
much certainty will be gained.97 All-of these potential problems in the Act
make attainment of the certainty goal questionable.98
94. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY FINAL RE-
PORT OFTHE INSURANCE STUDY ch. 4, at 91 (1977).
95. See notes 42-44 supra.
96. See note 58 supra.
97. Washington courts may not welcome the new limitations on product liability recovery with
open arms. The Washington judiciary has prided itself on developing a consumer-oriented tort law.
See. e.g., Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wn. 2d 11I, 117, 587 P.2d 160. 163 (1978). The
Washington Supreme Court has been in the forefront in expanding and developing tort law. See, e.g.,
Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wn. 2d 319, 323, 609 P.2d 1382, 1384 (1979) (refusing to extend com-
parative fault to strict liability); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456. 463, 12 P.2d 409, 412
(1932) (removing requirement of privity of contract in breach of warranty actions); Mazetti v. Ar-
mour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 627, 135 P. 633, 634 (1913) (removing requirement of privity in breach
of warranty actions involving food). Given this judicial viewpoint, Washington courts may try to find
ways around the new law. For example, when the Washington Supreme Court, in Helling v. Carey.
83 Wn. 2d 514, 518-19, 519 P.2d 981, 982-83 (1974), held opthalmologists liable for failing to
give glaucoma tests even though the custom in the profession was not to give such tests, the legisla-
ture quickly passed a statute, Act of May 12, 1975, ch. 35, § 1, 1975 Wash. Laws 252 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (1981)), which they believed reversed the new development. The new
statute theoretically required doctors to adhere only to that standard of care expected of others in the
field. The Washington Supreme Court nonetheless construed the new statute to require the same stan-
dard as that in Helling v. Carey. Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wn. 2d 246, 254, 595 P.2d 919,924 (1979).
98. As a corollary to the benefit of added certainty, proponents point to the benefit of reduced
evidentiary problems because there will be fewer suits involving older products. Although the under-
lying assumption that product liability defendants suffer from unique evidentiary problems is ques-
tionable, the new Act does not eliminate such problems. Because of the nature of the useful safe life
approach, every claim will potentially require consideration of factors establishing a useful safe life.
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B. The Costs Inherent in the Act
1. Arbitrary Cutoff ofNonaccrued Claims
The primary objection to statutes of repose is the inequity of abolishing
plaintiffs' claims before injuries occur. 99 Unlike a traditional statute of
limitations where a plaintiff is punished for "sleeping on his claim," 00
the punishment under a statute of repose falls on a victim of a defective
product who did absolutely nothing wrong. Proponents often point to the
small nuinber of claims involving older products' 01 to minimize this in-
dictment. This argument is flawed in two respects, however. First, it ig-
nores the magnitude of the rejected claims, 02 a magnitude which takes on
human dimensions when it is recalled that the victims must bear these
costs on their own. Second, this argument represents an attempt by manu-
facturers and insurers to "have their cake and eat it too." The number of
older product claims is minimized by manufacturers and insurers when
attempting to show statutes of respose are equitable, yet emphasized
when they argue that the statutes promote lower insurance premiums.
It is true that coupling the useful safe life approach with a rebuttable
presumption attempts to deal with this drawback. Though this attempted
balance is admirable, it is unnecessarily complex. Common law impedi-
ments to plaintiffs' recovery were already potentially overpowering. 103
The common law tort system, which deals on a case-by-case basis, 10 is
preferable to this statute of repose approach. The common law approach
may be more inefficient, but it does not shortchange the interests of the
parties. As one court noted:
[A date-of-sale limiting period] does not meet the realities of life in today's
society where the consumer is dependent on a remote manufacturer for
many of the products he uses. The "repose" of the manufacturer must give
way to the welfare of the consuming public, and if this means liability in
perpetuity, so be it. Products containing defects when manufactured, which
remain undetected, are veritable time bombs ready to explode in the face of
the hapless consumer at any time. 105
Many of these factors involve events at the time of manufacture. See note 53 and accompanying text
supra. Thus, evidentiary problems will still be present.
99. See Massery, supra note 19, at 541.
100. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
101. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
102. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
103. In the insurance industry study, only 28% of the cases that went to trial resulted in awards
for the plaintiffs. CLosED CLAIM SuRvEy, supra note 64, at 23.
104. See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
105. Nelson v. Volkswagen of America, 315F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (D.N.H. 1970).
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2. Application of Tolling Exceptions
A second potential area of unfairness is the possible application of
preexisting statutory exceptions to general statutes of limitations to the
new statute of repose. The legislature previously provided tolling excep-
tions for infancy, incompetency, concealment or absence of the defendant
from the jurisdiction, and commencement of judicial proceedings. 106 Of
prime concern is how these exceptions mesh with the new "outside" stat-
ute of repose limits. If the tolling exceptions apply, the twelve-year pre-
sumption will not begin to run until the incompetency is gone. Commen-
tators have suggested that the policy arguments supporting the initial
adoption of the tolling exceptions fully apply against the statutes of re-
pose. 107 At least one court has so held. 108 Additional support for extend-
ing the tolling exceptions to Washington's statute of repose is the section-
by-section analysis of the new Act provided by the State Senate Select
Committee on Tort and Product Liability Reform. 109 The Select Commit-
tee said:
A special provision is made so that the time periods of the section do not
include the period under which a claimant is under a legal disability as de-
fined by RCW 4.16.190. This would protect minors during the period of
minority and persons under a guardianship, as well as others covered by that
statute. 110
Whether the Select Committee was referring to both the statute of repose
and statute of limitations is unclear. Arguably the comment extends to
both.
The tolling exceptions should apply to the discovery rule and the stat-
ute of limitations in section 7(3) because the exceptions only apply to
claims that have already accrued. I I The desirability of extending tolling
exceptions to the statute of repose is doubtful. The existence of general
tolling exceptions stems from the inability of an incompetent party to pro-
cess a claim which has already accrued. The objective of the statute of
repose of section 7 is to cut off claims that have not yet accrued, thereby
106. See. e.g., WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.16.180-.250(1981).
107. See. e.g., Phillips, supra note 79, at 672.
108. Parlato v. Howe, 470 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. Tenn. 1979). This case involved Tennessee's
three-year medical malpractice statute. The court found that even with the legislature's desire to limit
the period in which physicians face potential liability, it was onerous to require very young children
to bring causes of action. Id. at 999-1000.
109. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 44-45, reprinted in 1981 WASH. S. JOUR. at 634.
110. Id.
111. Section 7(3) provides that the three-year statute of limitations is "[s]ubject to the applicable
provisions of chapter 4.16 RCW pertaining to the tolling and extension of any statute of limitations
.... "WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.060(3) (1981).
520
Vol. 57:503, 1982
Useful Safe Life Defense
shifting attention to the age of a product rather than to the length of time a
claimant waits to bring a claim. Thus, the fact of disability is irrelevant
when considering unaccrued claims.
The following example helps clarify the unfairness of extending the
tolling exceptions to the statute of repose. Assume X, a twenty-five year
old, and Y, a fifty year old, were both passengers on a Boeing 707 in-
volved in a crash caused by a Boeing manufacturing defect. The airline
purchased the plane from Boeing fifteen years before the accident. In a
suit against Boeing, X would not face the twelve-year presumption be-
cause the twelve-year period began to run only after he reached majority,
age eighteen. Y, however, would face the presumption because the
twelve-year period expired three years earlier. This anomaly emerges
even though X and Y were both adults at the time of the crash, fully able
to prosecute their actions. The plight of incompetents is the same as com-
petents and does not deserve special treatment. Applying tolling excep-
tions to the statute of repose would be unfair to competent claimants, yet
this result is possible in light of the Act's imprecise legislative history.
3. Reduces Incentive to Make Safety Improvements
Section 7 also has the possible effect of reducing manufacturers' incen-
tive to make safety improvements in their products. One of the prime
rationales for adopting strict liability was to provide an economic incen-
tive for safety improvements. 112 To the extent that section 7 is successful
in limiting liability in claims involving older products, the incentive to
make products longer-lived will be gone. 113 Instead there will be incen-
tive to make twelve-year "one-hoss shays ":114 products that disintegrate
after the twelve-year product liability has passed. Although market com-
petition provides counterincentives to provide longer-lived and safer
products,' 15 the limitation of product liability loosens the grip on ensuring
safe products.
112. Johnson, Product Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REV. 677, 691
(1978).
113. Id. See also Elfin, Products Liability Developments and Tactics, 16 AM. Bus. L. J. 315,
326(1979).
114.
Have you heard of the wonderful one-hoss shay,
That was built in such a logical way
It ran a hundred years to a day,
And then, of a sudden, it ....
O.W. HOLMES, The Deacon's Masterpiece or, The Wonderful "One-Hoss Shay," in COMPLETE
POETICAL WORKS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 158 (Cambridge ed. 1914).
115. A product seller might not last long in business if the firm develops the reputation of being a
manufacturer of short-lived or dangerous products.
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V. CONCLUSION
Washington has joined the parade of other states by adopting product
liability reform that includes changes in the time in which a product liabil-
ity suit may be brought. The full impact of the useful safe life defense,
rebuttable presumption, and limited discovery rule awaits its reception by
the Washington judiciary as well as the judiciary in other jurisdictions in
multistate product liability actions. 116
The fundamental goals behind the legislation are justifiable: namely to
balance plaintiffs' rights to recover for injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts against product sellers' needs to have available, affordable product
liability insurance. However, the mechanism chosen to balance these
goals will probably succeed in attaining neither goal. The limited number
of older product claims provides an insufficient basis to transmit certainty
throughout the tort system. Likewise, the lack of specificity in the "use-
ful safe life" concept will breed expensive litigation even before the merit
of claims is examined. The resulting uncertainty of future liability will
take its toll on product liability insurance premiums.
To the extent, though, that the Act does limit liability, policy consider-
ations do not support the limitation. Limitations on liability are unfair to
innocent claimants and inconsistent with safety incentive and cost alloca-
tion goals. Fortunately, the "useful safe life" approach chosen by Wash-
ington produces less of these harmful side effects than the more drastic
alternatives adopted in other states.
Because section 7 will probably attain neither of its desired goals, this
Comment proposes two alternative courses of action for the legislature.
First, if the legislature is intent on increasing certainty in the product lia-
bility field it should either repeal the useful safe life and rebuttable pre-
sumption approach and adopt an absolute bar to recovery after a given
number of years from date of sale, or else it should impose a clear and
convincing evidence standard in order to rebut the presumption. Addi-
tionally, the legislature should expressly indicate that this absolute bar or
modified useful safe life is considered substantive law and not procedural,
thereby increasing the chance that the statute of repose will be applied in
multistate product liability actions.
116. Section 7 will inevitably launch the plaintiff's bar on a voyage to find new theories, new
parties. and new exceptions to allow detours around obstructions to recovery or erosion of the ob-
structions. For example, actions might be brought against the owners of products who use them
beyond their useful safe life. The use beyond the twelve year period might be argued as presumed
negligence. See Proposed Tort Legislation. WASHINGTON TRIAL LAWYER'S Ass'N TRIAL NEws. Nov.
1980, at I, 3. See also McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in
Product Liability Actions: Present and Future. 16 FORUM 416, 434-35 (1981) (predicting emergence
of new theories and defendants).
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The second and preferred alternative is to repeal section 7 and return to
the common law approach. This alternative might not increase certainty
for insurers or manufacturers as much as the first alternative, but it is
better in protecting the interests of consumers and society in general by
fostering safer products.
In section 7, the Washington Legislature attempted to snip off the long
"tail" of product liability which had grown on manufacturers. The sec-
tion 7 "scissors," however, are not sharp enough to cut through this
"tail." Either the legislature should sharpen the scissors by increasing the
conclusiveness of the cutoff or else should accept that these "tails" re-
flect the true societal costs of products manufactured and are desirable. It
is hoped that the latter course of action is chosen.
Bruce L. Schroeder
